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Theo A. F. Kuipers
WHAT IS THE BEST EMPIRICALLY EQUIVALENT THEORY? 
REPLY TO IGOR DOUVEN
Douven’s paper certainly is a very constructive one relative to ICR. It supports 
my turn to “inference to the best theory” (IBT) as a critically revised version of 
the standard rule of “inference to the best explanation” (IBE), it argues for an 
important refinement of IBT, and it shows ways of empirically testing it. I 
have nothing to criticize in the main argument, but I would just like to make 
some local remarks. But let me start by remarking that Igor Douven (1996) 
introduced the important notion of an OUD shift, that is, a shift in the 
Observable/Unobservable Distinction. It helped me a lot in clarifying the long-
term dynamics of scientific research as described in ICR. Specifically, in 
Section 9.2.2., I first discuss in general what arguments can be given for 
specific and general, separate and comparative reference claims. I then deal 
with theoretical arguments, followed by experimental and then combined ones. 
Finally, I deal with the consequences of the acceptance of specific reference 
claims together with experimental and/or theoretical criteria for applying them, 
that is, when an OUD-shift has taken place. In this reply I first indicate how 
theoretical virtues of theories can be taken into account within my general 
approach. I then indicate what I like to call the “referential Douven test.”
Theoretical Virtues 
At the end of Section 3 Douven pleads for taking “theoretical virtues” into 
account in evaluating the merits of theories, in particular when the theories to 
be compared are empirically equivalent. He rightly remarks that I have studied 
this problem more recently, see (Kuipers 2002), with special emphasis on 
aesthetic virtues or, more precisely, “nonempirical features which (certain) 
scientists (have come to) find beautiful, that is, to which they ascribe aesthetic 
value” (Kuipers 2002, p. 299). Let me quote the abstract of that paper:
In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of the relation between beauty, 
empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the one hand on a hypothetical 
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variant of the so-called ‘mere-exposure effect’ which has been more or less established in 
experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationships in general and aesthetic 
appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968, Temme 1983, Bornstein 1989, Ye 2000). On the 
other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthlikeness and truth approximation as 
presented in my From instrumentalism to constructive realism (2000). 
The analysis supports the findings of James McAllister in his beautiful 
Beauty and revolution in science (1996), by explaining and justifying them. 
First, scientists are essentially right in regarding aesthetic criteria useful for 
empirical progress and even for truth approximation, provided they conceive 
of them as less hard than empirical criteria. Second, the aesthetic criteria of the 
time, the “aesthetic canon,” may well be based on “aesthetic induction” 
regarding nonempirical features of paradigms of successful theories which 
scientists have come to appreciate as beautiful. Third, aesthetic criteria can 
play a crucial, schismatic role in scientific revolutions. Since they may well be 
wrong, they may, in the hands of aesthetic conservatives, retard empirical 
progress and hence truth approximation, but this does not happen in the hands 
of aesthetically flexible, “revolutionary” scientists.
For critical commentaries on this paper I refer the reader to the 
contributions by Miller (this volume) and Thagard (the companion volume). 
Here I shall merely focus on the formal point of the paper, according to which 
“more truthlikeness,” besides being empirically at least as successful, entails 
sharing at least as many nonempirical features with the true theory, as far as 
“distributed” features are concerned, that is, features that hold for all relevant 
models. Hence, if we have reasons to assume that the (strongest) true theory 
has certain nonempirical features, such features may guide theory choice 
aiming at truth approximation. Quoting the introduction of the paper, with 
some insertions, I claim:
… an aesthetic success [or, more generally, a theoretical success] can be just as good a 
signpost to the truth as an extra case of explanatory success, albeit in a more modest 
degree. The relevant difference is that the justified desirability of such an explanatory 
success can be more reliably established than that of an aesthetic [theoretical] feature, 
which is why the latter should be approached with more care.
Hence, I would like to claim that the paper on beauty essentially answers 
Douven’s implicit question, as far as “distributed” virtues are concerned, when 
he writes: “In whatever precise way theoretical virtues are going to play a role 
in comparing the goodness of theories, I shall henceforth assume IBT to 
operate on the basis of a definition of ‘best theory’ that takes these virtues into 
account in some formally and intuitively acceptable way.” (p. 292) 
Unfortunately, I have not presented that paper in terms of IBT. However, in 
these terms, the amended IBT would at least include the subrule that of two 
empirically equivalent theories the theoretically more successful one should be 
chosen, for the time being, as the closest to the truth. As an aside, in response 
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to Note 9, this implies that Douven’s argument against speaking of “the best 
explanation,” instead of “the best theory,” would disappear. However, my own 
argument, according to which it sounds problematic to leave (very much) room 
for the possibility that the best explanation is already known to be falsified, 
remains valid.
The Referential Douven Test 
The above suggested (partial) emendation of IBT immediately implies that I do 
not agree with Douven’s claim in Note 12, in which he suggests that such a 
subrule has no justification in terms of truth (approximation), for which reason 
he focuses in Section 4 on the empirical justification of the amended IBT. To 
be sure, I would like to agree with Douven’s point at the beginning of Section 
4.1 that realists have to justify more than, to use his term borrowed and 
adapted from Psillos (1999), horizontal inference to the best theory. The latter 
rule corresponds to the observational version of the three versions of IBT that I 
distinguish (ICR, p. 228, see also Kuipers 2004 for a more detailed analysis): 
Inference to the best theory on the observational/referential/ theoretical level 
(as the closest to the relevant truth). More specifically, entity realists have to 
justify in addition the referential version and theory realists the theoretical one.
However, empirical justifications, rightly advocated by Douven, must also 
have some relation to the truth approximation account. More specifically, 
whereas explanatory successes are based on (low-level) inductive 
generalizations or “object-induction,” that is, induction of a regularity about 
(the behavior of) a certain kind of objects, theoretical successes are based on 
“meta-induction,” that is, induction of a recurring nonempirical feature 
correlating with empirical success. Object-inductions are not very trustworthy, 
but they are certainly more trustworthy than meta-inductions. In a way, the 
bootstrap tests described by Douven must give an empirical justification of 
both types of induction, with the relevant differences, of course. However, it 
may well be that his tests are essentially tests of the methodological substrate 
of IBT, that is, the (also to be amended) rule of success (RS) (ICR, p. 114). In 
ICR (p. 227) I already suggested one particular form of such a test in relation o 
OUD and OUD shifts mentioned above: “Here it should be mentioned that an 
interesting test can be attached to the rationality of RS, which is a version of a 
test suggested by Douven (1996) and which we would like to call the Douven 
test. If most of our RS-choices on the basis of the old OUD, remain in tact 
after the OUD-shift, it suggests that RS is not only in theory, but also in 
practice, very fruitful for truth approximation.” In particular, this outcome of 
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the (referential) Douven test would give empirical support to the referential 
version of IBT attached to RS, in addition to its theoretical support. 
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